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8.78 COUNTY OF Los ANGELES V. LA FUENTE [20 C. (2d) 
sary to determine whether one who owns property not exceed-
ing the amount specified by the Old Age Security Law, and 
who has refused the offer ofa home with a relative re.~ponsible 
under the law for his support, is in indigent circumstances 
within the meaning of section 22 of article IV of the Constitu-
tion. , 
[5] But even though the recipient of old age security bene-
fits may be entitled to receive the benefits of the law, yet, the 
appellant contends, the county should' have no right to reim-
bursement from a responsible relative when, before the aid 
was extended, the relative offered to support the recipient in 
his home. Section 2224 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
is complete in itself, and gives a right of action to the county 
if the person receiving aid has within the state a spouse or 
adult child pecuniarily able to support him. Upon the direc-
tion of the designated authorities, recovery may be had of 
such portion of the aid advanced as therelative is able to pay. 
(County of Lake v. Forbes, 42 CaL App. (2d) 744 [109 P. 
(2d) 972].) 
The measure of responsibility, as fixed by this statute, is 
in terms of money. If, as contended by the appellant, the only 
way in which she could' support her parents was in her home 
and not by pecuniary assistance, such fact would' constitute an 
absolute defense to her liability under the statute. The inten-
tion of the Legislature in this regard is also shown by the 
1941 amendment to section 2181 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, establishing a relative's maximum contribution 
scale based entirely upon the monetary income of the relative 
and the number of persons dependent on that income for sup-
port, and also providing the board of supervisors with discre-
tion to accept less than the amount established by the scale 
in the event of unusual expenses. But there is no evidence of 
the appellant's inability to give her parents any financial 
assistance other than her own assertion to that effect, unsup-
ported by any testimony as to how her relatively large income 
is spent. Under such circumstances, the trial court was clearly 
justified in finding that she is able to contribute to the finan-
cial support of her parent~ and to reimburse the county for 
the aid advanced to them. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, 
J., concurred. 
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[L. A. No. 18350. In Bank; Se~t.29;1942.] 
O. P. WALKER, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF.SAN GA-
BRIEL (a Municipal Corporation) et al."Resp,onden~s.,,: 
[1] Administrative Law-Judicial Remedies.~Either certior~ri m,' 
mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which to't~sf tli~ 
prope:, exercise of discretion vested In a local board. . . 
[2] Licenses-Revocation-Hearing-EvideIlCe.-A board co.mmit~ 
an ['.buse of discretion when it revokes a license to conduct a 
legitimate business without competent evidence establishing 
just cause for revocation. There must be substantial evidence 
to support such a ruling; and'in the absence of statute so 
providing, hearsay, such as a letter from the chief of police 
enumerating. the charges against the licensee, is not competent 
evidence to that enu. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Alfred E. Paonessa, Judge pro tem. Re-
versed. 
Certiorari proceeding to annul an order revoking' Ii 
license, in which the trial court issued an alternative writ 
of mandamus. Judgment of nonsuit reversed. 
Keller & Smith and Morris Lavine for Appellant, 
Herbert S. Farrell for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-The petitioner applied to. the Superior 
Court in Los Angeles County for a writ of certiorari to ann.ul 
an order of the city council of the respondent city of San 
Gabriel revoking his license to conduct an automobile wreck-
ing business in that city. The trial court issued an alterna~ 
tivc writ of mandamus as an appropriate step in the pro~ 
cccding. Issue was joined by the respondents'answer. Afte~ 
the introduction of oral and documentary evidence the re~ 
spondents moved for a judgment of nonsuit, which was 
[1] See 4 Cal. Jur. 1076. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law; [2]' Ll~l 
censes, § 55. 
• 
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granted. The petitioner appealed. The following are the 
facts disclosed at the trial: 
For thirteen years prior to January, 1941, the petitioner 
had conducted an automobile wrecking business in the city 
of San Gabriel. On the 22nd day of that month he received 
notice that the city council proposed to revoke his license 
to operate his business, and that January 28, 1941, was fixed 
as the time for a hearing. An ordinance of the city required 
the issuance of a license to engage in the business of auto-
mobile wrecking. It provided that such a license be issued 
and accepted with the understanding that the city council 
might· revoke it upon being satisfied that any term or condi-
tion thereof had been violated or that the holder was an un-
fit person to be entrusted with the privilege granted by the 
license. It was expressly provided that before any license 
be revoked for any of the reasons stated the holder should 
be given an opportunity to be heard by notice in writing 
fixing the time for hearing. 
On January 28, 1941, the time fixed in the notice, the 
petitioner appeared before the city council with his attor-
ney, who informed the members of the council that "Mr. 
Walker stood ready, able and willing to produce evidence 
and testimony as to why his license should not be revoked, 
but should await the evidence of why it should be." Where-
upon Police Officer Jorgensen read a letter addressed to the 
city council and signed by· the chief of police of. the city. 
That letter set forth numerous charges against the peti-
tioner, claimed to be violations of the ordinances of the city 
or otherwise deemed sufficient to justify a revocation of the 
license. 
Thereupon the petitioner was asked if he had anything 
to say. His attorney replied that until the persons making 
the complaints were produced, and an opportunity given 
to cross-examine them, there was no evidence before the city 
council and nothing for the petitioner to refute. The city 
council offered to continue the hearing to a later date if the 
petitioner desired to introduce evidence on his own behalf. 
But the petitioner, through his attorney, declined to pro-
duce any witnesses until witnesses supporting the charges 
made by the chief of police had been produced and subjectt~d 
to cross-examination. The city council thereupon revoked 
the petitioner's license. 
At the trial the suJiiciency of the notice to rCivoke the. 
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license and of the fixing of the time for hearing was con-
ceded by the petitioner. His principal contention then and . 
now is that the city council acted arbitrarily and committed 
an abuse of its discretion when it revoked his license upon 
hearsay evidence only. 
[1] Either certiorari or mandamus is an appropriate 
remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested in a 
local board. (Garvin v. Ohambers, 195 Cal. 212 [232 Pac. 
696] ; Mann v. Tracy, 185 Cal. 272 [196 Pac. 484] ; Dierssen. 
v. Oivil Service Oommission, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 53 [110 P. 
(2d) 513]; Naughton v. Retirement Board of San Francisco, 
43 Cal. App. (2d) 254 [110 P. (2d) 714].) 
It is not contended that the provisions of the ordinance 
are not in conformity with the requirement of due process 
(see Oarroll v. Oalifornia Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal. (2d) 
164 [105 P. (2d) 110], and cases cited). But it is claimed 
that the city council had no power to revoke the petitioner's 
license without a showing of just cause, as defined by the 
ordinance, and that the letter from the chief of police, being 
hearsay only, did not constitute competent evidence that just 
cause existed. 
[2] It is well settled that a board commits an abuse of 
discretion when it revokes a license to conduct a legitimate 
business without competent evidence, establishing just cause 
for revocation, and that hearsay evidence alone is. insufficient 
to support the revocation of such a llcllnse .. , In JJonsoUdated 
Edison 00. v. NatiOnal Labor Relations Board, 305 U .. S. 
197 [59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126], ~e Supreme Court pf 
the United States observed at page 230 that ,the. i, assurap.ce 
of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does p.ot 
go so far as to justify orders without a. basis in evidence 
having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hear-
say or rumor does not constitute substap.tlal.evidence.' 1 Th~~e 
must be substantial evidence to support such a. board's rUl-
ing, and hearsay, unless specially perniitted by statute,. is 
not competent evidence to that end. (See Englebretson: ~. 
Ind1~trial Acc. Com., 170 Cal. 793 [151 Pac. 421J; Em: 
ployers Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 170 Cal. 
800 [151 Pac. 423] ; State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus 
trial Ace. Com., 195 Cal. 174 [231 Pac. 996] ; Smith v. Board 
of Police Commissioners, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 292 ,[35 P. (2d) 
555, 36 P. (2d) 670]; Dyment v. Boal'd of MedicaZ Exam· 
.. 
'! 
'L 
I.:jl 
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iners, 93 Cal. App. 65 [268 Pac. 1073] ; Thrasher v. Board of 
Medical Exarniners, 44 Cal. App. 26 [185 Pac. 1006].) 
There' was no evidence before the city council on the 
hearing to revoke the petitioner's license except the letter 
froni the chief of pulice enumerating the charges against the 
petitioner. It was on that evidence alone that the council 
purported to revoke his license. The letter was competent 
only as a statement of the charges against the petitioner, but 
was not competent evidence 01= the truth of the charges stated 
'therein. In the absence of competent proof of the charges 
against the petitioner the city council was without power to 
revoke his license and therefore abused its discretion in" do-
ing so. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tem.; concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J;,Concurring.-The city council did not 
reserve the power to rilvoke licenses at its discretion. It 
reserved the power to revoke, if it adjudged, after a hearing 
on the law and' the facts, that a legal ground for revocation 
was established. The ordinance vested the adjudicating 
function in the council and prescribed that it should be 
exercised only after a hearing. It is sufficient to hold that 
the hearing intended was an adversary hearing, at which 
evidence was to be taken and a decision made, based on that 
evidence. The city had the burden of establishing its case, 
and until it introduced evidence the defendant licensee 
rightly took the position that there was no evidence to rebut. 
The majority opinion correctly characterizes the letter read 
by the police officer as a recital of the charges. The caSe may 
be disposed of simply on the ground that no hearing on 
these charges was had. If, however, the paper is to be re-
garded as evidence, it is clearly hearsay that would be inad-
missible in a court trial if proper objection were made. In 
administrative hearings hearsay commonly is admissible even 
over objections (Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed;], vol. 1, §§4-b, 
4-c), and the court does not now decide that it is not. What 
the court decides is that, in the absence of statutes to the 
contrary, there is no substantial e~idence to support an ad-
ministrative decision if the only evidence is hearsay. Accord-
ingly, the majority opinion assumes that in reviewing the 
decision' of a local administrative tribunal with respect to 
a disputed issue of fact the trial court can go no further 
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than to inquire if the administrative tribunal h:~d"beforeit ' 
any substantial evidence to support its decisiori.,"wheth~:rJhe 
review is by mandamus or by certiorari.,' ,'::'; ',"~,i, 
The opinion cites with approval Dierssen v. 'aip~'Z' '~ervic6 
Oommission, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 53 [110 P; (2d)' ~131; alld 
Naughton v. Retirement Board of San F'ranciSc6; ,43 ',9~. 
App. (2d) 254 [HO P. (2d) 714]. TliefuSt'caaeheld'that 
anyone attacking the decision of a local' adjlldicati,ng )oard 
by petition. for mandate must 'allege"that ,tlle b~~q' 'a~~.~ 
fraudulently, capriciously, or arbitrarily, and that,ILch,arg~ 
againilt theboard's decision of issues of fac~isn~(su!!l~~e4 
if the board had any substantial evidence before it: 'to sustain 
its decision. The second case cited follo~e<l't~e:same, nil~~ , 
The majority voted to annul the decision, of the 'b,oard o~ 
the g1'ound that there was no evidence in the record to sup~ 
port the board's finding. Peters, J., concUrring, iiaid: i'U 
mandamus is used, the extent of the 'review' is to determi,:iie; 
its pointed out in the main opinion, whether'theloca.lboard 
has acted arbitrarily and clearly in a.buse of'its ,discretion.' 
So far as the evidence is concerned, that means that the 
superior court's power is limited to determining whether 
there is any substantial evidence to support ,tli~ :(indi~gs of 
the board. There is no doubt that the cases ,hold,aS stateq, 
in the main opinion, that mandamus may be 'uSed by the 
aggrieved party. Whichever remedy is used, so far, as the 
evidence is concerned, the extent of the 'review' is exactly 
the same." 
Why permit mandamus to be extended to reach a result 
that would have been reached by certiorari' It would be 
better to preserve the traditional distinctions, between the 
two writs. In this instance certiorari was clearly the ap~ 
plicable writ. (Garvin v. Ohambers, 195 Cal. ,212'[232 p'ac. 
696] ; Legault v. Board of TrUstees, 161 Cal. i9,7,'[11S Pac. 
706, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519]; Murray v. SUpervisors, 23 
Cal. 492, 493; Nider v. Oity Oommission, 36 Oal.1\.pp. (2d) 
14 [97 P. (2d) 293]; Rigdon v. Oommon Oouncil, 30 Cal. 
App. 107 [157 Pac. 513]; Great Western Power 00. v: 
Supervisors, 21 Cal. App. 146 [131 Pac. 88].) On certiorari 
the' court would have directed the council to' certify up the 
record of its proceedings, and would readily have determined 
whether that record showed that the council had before it 
any substantial evidence to support its decision. Instead, 
the court, proceeding by mandamus, permitted persons who 
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were present at the council meeting to testify as to what 
occurred there and to give oral evidence as to what evidence 
was presented at the council meeting. Counsel for the city 
objected that the best evidence rule was thereby violated, 
but the objection was overruled. If the record of the hear-
ing before the council had been introduced, as it should have 
been, the court would then have been in the same position 
as if it had proceeded by certiorari. 
While the law thus seems to be settled in this state that 
local agencies may exercise adjudicating powers and that 
their decisions are respected by courts if there is subst.antial 
evidence to Support them, it is anomalous that the Legisla-
ture is without power to put the decision of state boards 
on the same footing. In Laisne v. California State Board of 
Optometry, 19 Cal. (2d) 831 [123 P. (2d) 457], a majority 
of this court held that it would be an unconstitutional vest-
ing of judicial power in a state board to give any degree 
of finality to its decision of issues of fact in the revocation 
of a professional license. In consequence, there must be a 
complete judicial retrial of its fact decisions. The objections 
to that doctrine are set forth at length in the dissenting 
opinion in the Laisne case. The majority opinion there con-
cluded that such constitutional judicial power could be vested 
in local administrative bodies and that the exercise of such 
power could be controlled, as to local boards, by the writ 
of certiorari. (Laisne v. California State Board of Optom-
etry, supra, p. 847.) The inconsistency in characterizing the 
revocation of a license by a state-wide board as ministerial 
and reviewable by mandamus, while the same function when 
performed by a local board would be judicial and review-
able by certiorari, has been pointed out in the Laisne dis-
sent and elsewhere. (La,isne v. California State Board of 
Optometry, supra, p. 869; see Elliott, Certiorari and the 
Local Board [1941], 29 Cal. L. Rev. 586, 598; McGovney, 
Court Review of Administrative Decisions [1942], 15 So. Cal. 
L. Rcv. 391, 409; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review the 
Acts of State-Wide Administrative Bodies in California [1941], 
29 Cal. L. Rev. 275; [1937] 25 Cal. L. Rev. 694, 704.) 
If the writ of certiorari lies to review the revocation of 
petitioner's license by the local board in the present case, 
it would follow under the majority opinion in the Laisne 
case that an exercise of constitutional judicial power is in-
volved. Upon what ground, then, can it be held consistently 
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that the writ of mandate is available 1 There is no refusal 
to perform a ministerial duty or absence of an adequate rem-
edy, as in Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors &-
Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75 [87 P. (2d) 848]. (See Laisne 
v. California state Board of Optometry, supra, p. 833.) The 
only plausible explanation for the extension of mandate to 
review the acts of local boards seems to be the unexpressed 
recognition that it is irrational to hold that a particular 
activity, the revocation of licenses, is nonjudicial and review-
able exclusively by mandate when the revocation is by a 
state-wide board and still adhere to the older doctrine that 
it is a judicial function and reviewable by certiorari exclu-
sively when the revocation is by a local agency. 
If it were contended that the record of the city council's 
hearing disclosed that it had before it other evidence sup-
porting its decision than that disclosed by the testimony 
in the trial court, there would be no alternative but to re-
mand the case to the trial court, with instructions to issue 
a writ of certiorari. Since it appears, however, that in the 
trial court counsel for the city did not contend that the 
city council had before it any other evidence, it seems that 
the result would have been the same had the' case been tried 
on certiorari. Consequently, it is unnecessary to dissent 
from the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
rCrim. No. 4425. In Bank. Sept. 29, 1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROY J. PUTNAM, 
Appellant. 
[1] Lewdness-Preliminary Proceedings-Probable Oause.-Rcns-
on able or probable cause for the commitment· of a defendant 
is established where at a preliminary hearing atwelve-year-
old boy testifies that the defendant felt his private parts, 
where his mother corroborated the fact of his making a com-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Lewdness, § 7; [2] .Criminal Law, 
§ 686; [3] Criminal Law, § 717j [4] Criminal Law, § 686jLewdness, 
§ 19; [5] Lewdness, § 21. 
